

# Communication Strategies of NGOs: Theory and Evidence

—WORK IN PROGRESS—

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# Background: What do NGOs do?

1. Implement or subsidize projects in the field [not in this paper]
2. Advocacy
  - ▶ Lobby to influence policy making (public politics)
  - ▶ Influence firms' and stakeholders' behavior (private politics)  
Information campaigns, boycotts, environmental labeling
3. Fundraising

# NGO advocacy and information

**Information** is their main instrument to influence social/environmental outcomes:

1. they observe corporate behavior and its social/environmental impact
2. and convey this information to stakeholders willing to pay for a better environment and to policy makers

Their communication may have tremendous impacts

- ▶ Volkswagen and the International Council for Clean Transportation (ICCT)


NGOs rank highest in trust (e.g. Globescan "Trust in Institutions")

↪ NGOs send **credible information** to stakeholders.

# Good Cops and Bad Cops:

Cheering the leaders or booing the laggards?

- ▶ Lyon (ed.) (2010): analysis of the strategies of NGOs towards business, through a number of cases
- ▶ In certain cases they transmit **good news**  
They provide information on environmentally/socially friendly firms: they cheer the leaders



**GREENPEACE**

- ▶ In other cases, they mostly transmit **bad news** on corporations: they signal the laggards



*Great news!*

**PRIMARK<sup>®</sup>**

*commits to Detox*

[www.greenpeace.org/detox](http://www.greenpeace.org/detox)



# Data

- ▶ Source: Covalence EthicalQuote
- ▶ 22,942 pieces of news published by 634 NGOs on their own websites about the activities of 658 firms
- ▶ Period: 2002-2014
- ▶ A piece of news:

NGO + Firm + Criterion + Date + Good or Bad

- ▶ 50 Criteria, grouped in 7 dimensions.  
Example: the dimension "Environment" contains criteria such as "Energy", "Emissions" and "Waste Management".

## News examples (1/3)

Date	13/6/2006
NGO	Corpwatch
Firm	Coca-Cola
Sector	Food, Beverage & Tobacco
Country	Uzbekistan
Dimension	Human Rights Policy
Good or Bad	Bad
Content	<p>Coca-Cola accused over Uzbek venture</p> <p>Coca-Cola has been hit with an arbitration claim seeking more than \$100m in damages, alleging that the world's largest soft drinks maker conspired with the government of Uzbekistan against a joint venture partner who fell out of favour with the country's authoritarian ruler, Islam Karimov. The claim comes as the company is already trying to repair its image in the face of lawsuits from labour groups in the US over allegations that it turned a blind eye to human rights abuses at its bottling plants in Colombia and Turkey.</p>




## News examples (2/3)

Date	19/8/2003
NGO	Greenpeace
Firm	Volkswagen
Sector	Automobiles & Components
Country	Netherlands
Dimension	Environment
Good or Bad	Good
Content	Profile: Volkswagen Product Innovation: Volkswagen has agreed to reduce the amount of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) in their products.



## News examples (3/3)

Date	30/10/2014
NGO	Friends of the Earth
Firm	TransCanada
Sector	Energy
Country	USA
Dimension	Energy
Good or Bad	Bad
Content	<p>Energy East Pipeline: Concerned Citizens in U.S. and Canada Pledge to Block TransCanada's Latest Tar Sands Scheme</p> <p>TransCanada has been a bad neighbor and a bully, and has misled landowners and local authorities, said Jane Klee of Bold Nebraska. (...) American environmental organizations have committed to standing with their Canadian counterparts in blocking this project</p>

## Share of bad news over time



# Top 50 NGOs



## Question

**Why and when do NGOs cheer the leaders or, conversely, signal the laggards?**

(When do they play Good Cop or Bad Cop?)

Two sets of explanations:

- ▶ Because they seek to maximize their impact on firms / stakeholders / public authorities' behavior?
- ▶ Because they seek to maximize donations which finance their activities?

# In the (economic) Literature

## Public and private politics by activists

- ▶ Theoretical papers that do not explicitly model the informational behavior of NGOs
- ▶ David Baron (2001, 2003, 2009, 2013)
- ▶ Daubanes & Rochet (2015) on activists in the policy game
- ▶ NGOs and globalization (Krautheim & Verdier, 2015, Aldashev, Limardi & Verdier, 2015)

## NGOs communication

- ▶ Lyon & Maxwell (2011): greenwashing under threat of audits by NGOs
- ▶ Feddersen & Gilligan, 2001: NGOs as information providers on product markets
- ▶ Couttenier & al. (2015): strategic timing and targeting of NGOs' communication

# What we do

A theory in which a NGO strategically chooses its communication to influence social outcomes

- ▶ we disentangle between Good News and Bad News
- ▶ in a framework where communication is limited

Two main predictions:

1. In a given situation, the NGO polarizes (either as a good cop or a bad cop)
2. The NGO play Bad Cop when the communication constraint is tight, Good Cop otherwise

Empirical evidence supporting the theoretical predictions

- ▶ using panel data, on 22,992 pieces of news communicated by 634 NGOs over the period 2002-2014
- ▶ Controlling for donation-maximizing behavior

# Theory



# A model of NGO as information intermediary

## A market situation with:

- ▶ A continuum of corporate activities, which can be good or bad. The initial share of good activities is  $\gamma$ .
- ▶ 1 representative stakeholder, does not observe quality directly, but can take actions to remove an activity from the market
  - ▶ A consumer, a shareholder, a regulator...
- ▶ 1 NGO that observes quality and can inform the stakeholder

# The stakeholder

## Preferences

- ▶ The value of any **good** activity is  $V$
- ▶ The value of any **bad** activity is  $V - E$  with  $V < E$ .
- ▶ The expected value for a belief  $\theta$  that the activity is good is:

$$w(\theta) = V - (1 - \theta)E.$$

## Actions

- ▶ She removes from the market any activity such that  $w(\theta) < 0$ 
  - ▶ The precise mechanism, and how the surplus between the firm and the stakeholder is shared, is irrelevant.


## Assumption

- ▶ In the absence of disclosure, the stakeholder accepts all activities:  $w(\gamma) > 0$ 
  - ▶ Before disclosure, activities are in the market
- ▶ Hence her objective is to remove bad activities from the market

# The NGO


- ▶ Its **objective** is to drive bad activities out of the market
  - ▶ Preferences aligned with the stakeholder so that the NGO is credible
- ▶ It observes the quality of individual activities and can disclose this information to modify stakeholder payoff  $w(\theta)$  through **Bayesian revision**.
- ▶ However, **communication is limited**. The NGO can only disclose the quality of a share  $\lambda$  of activities
  - ▶ To digest information is costly; limited space in the media or on the website; limited stakeholder attention
- ▶ Therefore it needs to select the news/activities
  - ▶ Good news or bad news?
- ▶ Assumption:  $\lambda < \min\{\gamma, 1 - \gamma\}$  (otherwise all the information can be transmitted.)

# Communication structure



- ▶ At the beginning of the game, the NGO chooses  $g$  and  $b$ , respectively the shares of good and bad news reported.
  - ▶  $g > b$ : Good Cop;  $g < b$ : Bad Cop
- ▶ Under the communication constraint:  $\gamma g + (1 - \gamma)b \leq \lambda$

# Stakeholder's posterior beliefs



After disclosure, the belief that a given activity is good is

- ▶  $\theta = 1$  when the stakeholder receives a **good news**
- ▶  $\theta = 0$  if she receives a **bad news**
- ▶  $\theta = \mu(g, b) = \frac{(1-g)\gamma}{(1-g)\gamma + (1-b)(1-\gamma)}$  if she does not receive any news

# Equilibrium Analysis

- ▶ Bayesian equilibrium where:
  - ▶ the NGO chooses  $(g, b)$
  - ▶ the stakeholder rejects a given activity or not based on (consistent) posterior belief on quality
- ▶ The NGO maximizes:

$$\begin{aligned} &g\gamma \times V && \text{known good} \\ &+ b(1 - \gamma) \times 0 && \text{known bad} \\ &+ ((1 - g)\gamma + (1 - b)(1 - \gamma)) \times \max(w(\mu(g, b)), 0) && \text{unidentified} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ For unidentified activities, the stakeholder removes from the market if and only if  $w(\mu(g, b)) > 0$ .

# The impact of bad news (intuition)

- ▶ Bad news have a direct effect: The stakeholder rejects the activity that is identified (as bad)

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The effect of **bad news** is direct: to remove identified bad activities from the market.

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The effect of **good news** is indirect. They damage the collective reputation of unidentified activities, leading to their rejection if the quantity of news is sufficient.

# Polarization

## Proposition

In any given situation  $(\lambda, \gamma, V, E)$ , the NGO polarizes: the optimal communication strategy is to be either a good cop ( $b = 0$ ) or a bad cop ( $g = 0$ ), but not to send mixed news.

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- ▶ General idea: Polarization induces most change in the beliefs of the stakeholders, hence most change in behavior.
- ▶ If an NGO sends enough good news, unidentified products are driven out. Then it does not make sense to send bad news, since bad products are already out.
- ▶ If an NGO sends bad news, then sending good news on top does not help



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# Cheering the Leaders or Booing the Laggards?

## Proposition

In a given situation  $(\lambda, \gamma, V, E)$

- ▶ if  $V < |V - E|$ , the NGO always chooses bad cop
- ▶ if  $V \geq |V - E|$ , the NGO chooses bad cop if and only if

$$\lambda < \frac{V - (1 - \gamma)E}{V - |V - E|}.$$

That is, bad cop if the communication constraint is tight

## Why a bad cop strategy when communication is limited?

- ▶ **Bad news** induce an **incremental** change in the market: The stakeholder rejects each activity that is identified.
  - ▶ The first news has an impact.
- ▶ **Good news** induce a **radical** shift of the market: The stakeholder rejects all unidentified products.
  - ▶ This only occurs if a sufficient amount of news is transmitted for  $w(\mu)$  to become negative

# Regression Analysis



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
NGO + Firm + Criterion + Date + Good or Bad

- ▶ 50 Criteria, grouped in 7 dimensions.  
Example: the dimension "Environment" contains criteria such as "Energy", "Emissions" and "Waste Management".

# Top 50 NGOs



# Polarization of NGOs




# Analysis at the situation level

- ▶ Big NGOs are not particularly polarized.
  - ▶ 38 percent of the NGOs are mixed; they emit 74 percent of the news
- ▶ Our theory predicts that a NGO polarizes depending on parameters' value  $((\lambda, \gamma, V, E))$
- ▶ A situation is defined as: **sector x dimension x year** and we assume the set of parameters  $(\lambda, \gamma, V, E)$  is NGO- and situation-specific.



# Prediction 1: NGOs polarize their communication in a given situation

All NGOs, with at least 2 news in the situation



## Prediction 2: Econometric strategy

- ▶ Theory says that NGO behaves as a good cop only if

$$\lambda < \frac{V - (1 - \gamma)E}{2V - E}.$$

- ▶ We assume  $\lambda$  is the number of news.

# Econometric specification

## Testable hypothesis

NGOs emitting a higher number of news in a given situation have a lower share of bad news.

$$\% \text{BADNEWS}_{isdt} = \beta \# \text{NEWS}_{isdt} + \mathbf{FE}_i + \mathbf{FE}_s + \mathbf{FE}_d + \mathbf{FE}_t + \epsilon_{isdt}$$

- ▶  $\% \text{BADNEWS}_{isdt}$ : Share of Bad News disclosed by NGO  $i$  on firms from sector  $s$  on dimension  $d$  in year  $t$
- ▶  $\# \text{NEWS}_{isdt}$ : Total # of News disclosed by NGO  $i$  on firms from sector  $s$  on dimension  $d$  in year  $t$
- ▶  $\mathbf{FE}_i$ : NGO fixed effects
- ▶  $\mathbf{FE}_s$ : Sector fixed effects
- ▶  $\mathbf{FE}_d$ : Dimension fixed effects
- ▶  $\mathbf{FE}_t$ : Time fixed effects

# Results

## All NGOs

Dependent Variable:	%BADNEWS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
#NEWS	-0.783* (0.397)	-0.931** (0.391)	-0.787** (0.298)
NGO FE :	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE :	Yes	Yes	-
Sector FE :	Yes	-	-
Dimension FE :	Yes	-	-
Sector $\times$ Dimension FE :	-	Yes	-
Sector $\times$ Dimension $\times$ Year FE :	-	-	Yes
Observations	8,025	8,025	8,025
R-squared	0.625	0.629	0.671

# Results

Mixed NGOs only


Dependent Variable:	%BADNEWS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
#NEWS	-1.095** (0.447)	-1.235** (0.448)	-1.033** (0.429)
NGO FE :	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE :	Yes	Yes	-
Sector FE :	Yes	-	-
Dimension FE :	Yes	-	-
Sector × Dimension FE :	-	Yes	-
Sector × Dimension × Year FE :	-	-	Yes
Observations	5,371	5,371	5,371
R-squared	0.409	0.418	0.508

## NGO size

Dependent Variable:	%BADNEWS		
#NEWS: Big NGO	-1.153** (0.462)	-1.353** (0.444)	-1.417*** (0.374)
#NEWS: Small NGO	0.214 (0.750)	0.200 (0.767)	0.872 (0.571)
NGO FE :	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE :	Yes	Yes	-
Sector FE :	Yes	-	-
Dimension FE :	Yes	-	-
Sector $\times$ Dimension FE :	-	Yes	-
Sector $\times$ Dimension $\times$ Year FE :	-	-	Yes
Observations	8,025	8,025	8,025
R-squared	0.625	0.629	0.672

# NGOs size

All NGOs



Mixed NGOs only



# Placebo

We should not find similar results when estimating the effect of

- ▶  $\#NEWS_{isdt}$  on  $\%BADNEWS_{isd,t-1}$
- ▶  $\#NEWS_{it}$  on  $\%BADNEWS_{isdt}$
- ▶  $\#NEWS_{sdt}$  on  $\%BADNEWS_{isdt}$



# Placebo

Dependent Variable:	$\%BADNEWS_{t-1}$	$\%BADNEWS$	$\%BADNEWS$	
Sample:	restricted	restricted	all obs.	all obs.
#NEWS	0.197 (0.720)	-1.818*** (0.183)		
#NEWS: NGO $\times$ Year			-0.566 (0.412)	
#NEWS: Situation				0.571 (0.666)
NGO FE:	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE :	-	-	-	Yes
Sector FE :	-	-	-	Yes
Dimension FE :	-	-	-	Yes
Sector $\times$ Dimension $\times$ Year FE :	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Observations	1,719	1,719	8,025	8,025
R-squared	0.753	0.722	0.671	0.625

## Alternative theory 1: NGO intrinsic preferences

- ▶ Theory: NGOs would have an intrinsic preference for sending either bad news or bad news
- ▶ Not true at least for the big ones which show mixed attitude (incl. Greenpeace)

## Alternative theory 2: Corporate Donations

- ▶ NGO behavior would be driven by the preferences of their donors
  - ▶ NGOs receiving more corporate donations have more resources and thus can communicate more (a higher  $\lambda$ )
  - ▶ Corporate donors prefer good news (about themselves)
- ▶ We collect information on firms' donations to NGOs.
- ▶ Data source : iWave - Verigift.
- ▶ Information from NGOs' annual reports (big donors)

*The World Can't Wait*

Annual  
Report | 07



# Donors

July 1, 2006-June 30, 2007

Friends of the Earth thanks all of our supporters for their dedication to protecting the planet.

## \$100,000 and Up

Avis Ogilvy Moore  
Blue Moon Fund  
Bunny and Dan Gabel  
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation  
Oak Foundation  
Public Welfare Foundation  
Richard and Rhoda Goldman Fund  
Stanback Fund of the Foundation  
for the Carolinas  
The Energy Foundation

## \$50,000 - \$99,999

Appleton Foundation  
Changing Horizons Fund  
CS Fund  
Educational Foundation of America  
Rausing Trust  
Russell Long and Ruth Krumbhaar  
Tides Foundation  
Turner Foundation  
Wallace Global Fund  
Working Assets

## \$25,000 - \$49,999

Anonymous  
Bank Trak  
Belvue Fund  
Mr. Douglas Legum  
Park Foundation  
Rockefeller Family Fund  
The Community Foundation for the  
National Capital Region  
The San Francisco Foundation  
The Summit Fund of Washington  
Wallace Genetic Foundation

## \$10,000 - \$24,999

2032 Trust  
Anonymous  
Arntz Family Foundation  
Carl H. Feldman  
Earth Friends  
Garrett Loube and Marcia Rodgers  
Harriett Crosby  
Heinz Charitable Fund

## Heller Charitable and Educational Fund

Jayni and Chevy Chase  
Jerry Babicka and Lynn P. Babicka  
John A. Sellon Trust  
Lisa and Douglas Goldman Fund  
Maverick Lloyd Foundation  
Merck Family Fund  
Michael J. Herz  
Ms. Carolyn Kleefeld  
Naomi and Nehemiah Cohen  
Foundation  
Newman's Own  
Northwest Fund for the  
Environment  
Sally Davidson  
The Bauman Foundation  
The Prentice Foundation  
The Roy A. Hunt Foundation  
Tom Hormel  
Weeden Foundation

## \$5,000 - \$9,999

Anonymous  
Attias Family Foundation  
Baum Foundation  
Bullitt Foundation  
Edwards Mother Earth Foundation  
Estate of Mildred A. Lillis  
Jewish Community Fund  
Katharine and Kenneth  
Mountcastle  
Leo and Kay A. Drey  
Mr. and Mrs. C. Frederick Buechner  
Ms. Jane MacLeish  
Prince Charitable Trust  
Randy Repass and Sally Christine  
Rodgers  
RBS Greenwich Capital Foundation  
Sacharuna Foundation  
Save Our Wild Salmon Coalition  
Seattle Foundation  
Underdog Fund of the Tides  
Foundation  
Vermont Forum on Sprawl, Inc.  
Wiancko Family Fund

## \$1,000 - \$4,999

Allan and Marion Hunt-Badiner  
Alliance for Public  
Accountability, Inc.  
Anonymous  
Arlie Schardt  
As You Sow Foundation  
Autodesk Inc.  
Compton Foundation, Inc.  
Cris Smith and Gail Gorlitz  
Dan and Z Kripke  
David and Colleen Newlin  
David Blair  
Dr. and Mrs. John B. Marks  
Dr. Edith F. Borie  
Dreamcatcher Fund  
Earthbound Organic Farms  
Edwardo Lao Rhodes  
Elizabeth Steele  
Frances A. Dubrowski  
Frances W. Stevenson  
Fred and Annette Gellert  
Gail Raywid  
Gary R. Nelson  
George Martin  
Goldman Environmental Fund  
Greystone Foundation  
Hilltop Group Charitable  
Foundation  
HMJS Fund of The Community  
Foundation for the National  
Capital Region  
Jennifer and Ted Stanley  
Jim and Linda Kuhns  
John and Patty Brissenden  
Kelly Collamore  
Kenneth and Eugenia Lange  
Lary and Judy East  
Linda and Marc Lawrence Family  
Marjorie & Richard Rogalski  
Men's Wearhouse  
Microsoft Matching Gifts Program  
Morgan Stanley  
Moscow Philanthropic Fund  
Mr. Alan Field  
Mr. and Mrs. Don Lichty

## Controlling for corporate donations

- ▶ Dummy variable at the NGO x Firm x Year level (= 1 if the NGO has received a donation from the firm)
- ▶ No information about the amount.
- ▶ We aggregate information at the NGO x Sector x Year level :  
 $\text{DONATION}_{ist} = 1$  if there has been at least one donation from firms in sector  $s$  to NGO  $i$  until year  $t$ .

# Corporate Donations - Version 1


Dependent Variable:	%BADNEWS						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
#NEWS	-3.857*** (1.112)	-4.187*** (1.164)	-2.993*** (0.750)	-3.830*** (1.089)	-4.148*** (1.133)	-2.961*** (0.726)	-3.658*** (0.851)
DONATION				3.636 (3.756)	4.274 (3.615)	4.469 (4.782)	
NGO FE :	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Year FE :	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
Sector FE :	Yes	-	-	Yes	-	-	-
Dimension FE :	Yes	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes
Sector $\times$ Dimension FE :	-	Yes	-	-	Yes	-	-
Sector $\times$ Dimension $\times$ Year FE :	-	-	Yes	-	-	Yes	-
NGO $\times$ Sector FE :	-	-	-	-	-	-	Yes
Observations	1,698	1,698	1,698	1,698	1,698	1,698	1,698
R-squared	0.553	0.565	0.719	0.553	0.565	0.719	0.664

## Corporate Donations - Version 2

Dependent Variable:	%BADNEWS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
#NEWS	-2.993*** (0.750)	-2.961*** (0.726)	-3.658*** (0.851)
DONATION		4.469 (4.782)	
NGO FE :	Yes	Yes	-
Year FE :	-	-	Yes
Dimension FE :	-	-	Yes
Sector $\times$ Dimension $\times$ Year FE :	Yes	Yes	-
NGO $\times$ Sector FE :	-	-	Yes
Observations	1,698	1,698	1,698
R-squared	0.719	0.719	0.664



# Conclusion

- ▶ Theoretical model of constrained NGOs' communication:
  - ▶ Good and bad news generate asymmetric effects.
  - ▶ NGOs have incentives to specialize on pure Good Cop / Bad Cop strategies depending on the situation.
  - ▶ The Good Cop strategy can have the strongest influence, but it works only if the NGO can send a sufficient amount of news.
  - ▶ The theory is robust to a number of extensions. 
- ▶ Data on news published by NGOs shows that, in a given situation:
  - ▶ NGOs polarize (Good Cop or Bad Cop).
  - ▶ The share of bad news sent by an NGO negatively correlates with the total number of news disclosed by this NGO.
  - ▶ This specialization pattern is not driven by unobservables at the NGO or situation level.

Thank You !

# Appendix

# Theory - Robustness

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The theoretical predictions hold when including:


- Continuous quality
- Bias between NGOs and stakeholders:  $\varepsilon > 0$   
Exact same prediction for moderate NGOs (low bias)  
Almost identical with extremist NGOs (high bias)
- NGOs' information is imperfect (but NGOs are better informed than the stakeholders)
- Noisy signals sent to consumers
- NGOs are endogenously credible when their preferences are (ordinally) aligned with stakeholders' preferences  
In other words, cheap talk works provided NGOs are sufficiently well informed (otherwise not listened too)

## Cleaning of the Dataset: Duplicated News & small NGOs

- ▶ 81% of the observations are *unique*, i.e. no news is published by the same NGO on the same [Firm x Criterion] during the whole period.
- ▶ Distance between two news on the same [Firm x Criterion]: 500 days (standard deviation: 694 days).
- ▶ First, we drop the duplicated news when it occurs **within 180 days** - 7% of the obs.
- ▶ 1,287 of the duplicated news are classified as bad, and 541 as good.
- ▶ Second, we keep the NGOs when they publish at least 5 news during the whole period. We drop 7.5% of the obs.
- ▶ **22,992 observations** in the cleaned dataset.

# Heterogeneity across criteria

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# Sectors

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Sector	# of News	% of Bad News	Top 1 Dimension	# of NGOs	# of Firms
<b>Manufacturing</b>					
Pharmaceutical Products	1974	73.2	Economic	169	25
Refined Petroleum Products	1733	83.61	Environment	155	12
Chemicals	1722	80.43	Environment	166	29
Computer and Electronic Products	1368	43.06	Environment	143	47
Beverages	1251	61.95	Environment	149	15
Food Products	1197	65.66	Environment	139	18
Motor Vehicles	1057	52.6	Environment	145	22
Basic Metals	797	80.05	Environment	105	26
Machinery and Equipment	366	52.46	Society	75	9
Electrical Equipment	221	47.96	Environment	48	7
Other Transport Equipment	164	57.93	Society	41	11
Other Manufacturing	138	55.07	Society	26	9
Tobacco	138	87.68	Society	27	5
Paper and Paper Products	102	58.82	Environment	26	7
Rubber and Plastic Products	75	84	Human Rights	21	6
Wearing Apparel	58	46.55	Governance	15	6
Fabricated Metal Products	17	64.71	Society	7	5
<b>Financial and insurance</b>	2515	59.92	Society	229	107
<b>Mining and quarrying</b>	2355	81.66	Society	200	41
<b>Wholesale and Retail Trade</b>	1665	57.66	Society	180	57
<b>Services</b>	1348	59.87	Environment	181	39
<b>Information and communication</b>	1061	51.74	Society	147	54
<b>Electricity and gas</b>	482	58.71	Environment	81	35
<b>Accommodation and food service act.</b>	429	54.31	Society	97	15
<b>Transportation and storage</b>	219	64.38	Environment	57	22
<b>Construction</b>	40	32.5	Environment	10	9

## Mixed NGOs only

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